A young man walks through a tunnel used for military operations in Daraya, in the Damascus countryside on December 8. Photo by Lens of A Young Damascene Man
In the first week of May 2017, a money transfer office in Istanbul raised its rate for a monthly money transfer to Eastern Ghouta from 2.5 to 18 percent. The increase - on a monthly transfer for the correspondent of the news website Inab Baladi - was justified because the tunnels connecting Qaboun and Barzeh to Eastern Ghouta had been closed due to the advance of Assad's forces.
The tunnels were back under the spotlight after Zahran Alloush, the former leader of Jaish al-Islam, left besieged Eastern Ghouta for Turkey in April 2015, and then returned to Ghouta in July of the same year. His visit to Turkey provoked speculation about the path he had taken at a time when all outlets from the opposition areas were closed by Assad's forces.
The tunnels and how they function have been under intense scrutiny since they provide financial benefits for all sides in the conflict in Syria. They have enabled brokers and traders to control markets in the besieged areas.
The Syrian regime has been imposing a tight blockade on Eastern Ghouta, which is controlled by opposition factions. Recently, the factions also maintained three core neighborhoods inside the capital, Damascus: Barzeh, Qaboun and Tishreen.
The factions dug tunnels to connect Ghouta to the neighborhoods they controlled in Damascus. The tunnels were initially used to transport fighters and ammunition, but were later expanded to transport civilians and goods - and even to fit vehicles and trucks. They were managed directly by the factions' leaders or by "civilian organizations" affiliated with the factions. But regardless of the controlling group's affiliation, it imposed regulations and conditions on the transit traffic - and taxes or royalties on goods. The opening of the tunnels was a direct threat to the smuggling business that had been conducted by the regime's forces via the Wafideen crossing point, and financed by well-connected business men such as Mohieddin Manfoush.
In mid-May 2017, Assad's forces gained control over Qaboun and Barzeh, which dramatically affected the smuggling business operated through the tunnels, and caused the prices of goods in Eastern Ghouta to soar to record highs.
Following an agreement that led to the expulsion of opposition fighters to northern Syria, the military media of the Syrian regime published videos showing their control over a number of tunnels in Qaboun.
Over the course of six months, reporters interviewed many of the decision-makers directly involved in the movement taking place within the tunnels. They used more than one tunnel between Damascus and Ghouta and collected information on the distribution of the tunnels, their management mechanisms and regulations and the ways in which businessmen smuggle goods into Ghouta.
Although some sources considered the tunnels to be "classified military information," others spoke of their experience either because they believed that people had the right to know who was responsible for destroying their livelihoods, or because they wanted to "expose" the factions that abused and exploited the civilians in the area.
Five main tunnels and a road for trucks
The first tunnel, dug in late 2013, connected Harasta to neighborhoods west of the highway, that are considered an extension of the Qaboun orchards. The tunnel was dug by the Fajr al-Umma faction, and was about 875 yards in length. It opened in summer 2014 and was used to transport fighters and weapons between the two areas, which were separated by a highway.
In January 2015, the Jaish al-Umma faction opened a tunnel parallel to the first, but after Jaish al-Umma was defeated by Jaish al-Islam, the people behind the tunnel turned to the Fajr al-Umma faction, which was in control of Harasta, where the tunnel is located.
Then, in May 2015, Failaq al-Rahman and al-Liwaa al-Awwal dug a tunnel called "Rahma" (Mercy), set aside for vehicles, and connecting Arbin, which was under the control of Failaq al-Rahman, with the areas controlled by al-Liwaa al-Awwal in Qaboun. The tunnel was approximately 3,060 yards in length and large enough for Kia 2400 trucks.
In September 2015, Failaq al-Rahman strengthened its control over the tunnels with a new tunnel called "Nour" (Light). The 1,960-yard Nour tunnel, which was dug in cooperation with Jabhat al-Nusra in Qaboun, was for pedestrians and connected Arbin with Qaboun.
Jaish al-Islam secretly joined the tunnel operations in June 2015. The faction dug a 2-mile tunnel that begins in Qaboun and ends in two gates, one of which leads to Zamalka and the other to Arbin. Jaish al-Islam later expanded the tunnel to fit cars and trucks.
In addition to these long tunnels, there are unmanned underground passages used for secret military purposes. There also have been unsuccessful attempts to dig other tunnels. Ahrar al-Sham and Fatah al-Sham, for example, embarked on digging a tunnel to connect Qaboun and Ghouta, but the operations stopped five months later due to the tense situation in Qaboun.
The 'cheese prince,' free in a besieged kingdom
From a neighborhood in Misraba in Eastern Ghouta, the Syrian businessman Mohieddin Manfoush runs his business. His profits from dairy produce have won him the nickname "the prince of cheese."
Manfoush is the owner of al-Marai al-Dimashqiya Co. (Damascus Pastures), founded in 2003. Although al-Marai's factories are located in Eastern Ghouta, its products are distributed and sold in Damascus and the country's other provinces, as well as in neighboring countries. In early May, the company participated in Food Expo, an exhibition for the food and packaging industry at the Dama Rose Hotel in Damascus, and its stand was visited by Bishr Yazji, the minister of tourism in the Syrian government.
Due to his financial connections and popularity, Manfoush travels between Eastern Ghouta and Damascus whenever he wishes, without harassment from any of the parties in the area.
With the approval and cooperation of the regime's forces, Manfoush brings into Eastern Ghouta an average of two food shipments per day. His shipments enter the area through the Wafideen (Arrivals) crossing point, which was named after the Wafideen camp in Douma. According to local small businessmen who spoke to Inab Baladi and asked not to be identified, by the time the goods enter Douma and reach the small business owners their prices have increased dramatically and are sometimes 20 times higher than elsewhere. This is because those bringing the goods in have to pay high bribes at the checkpoints. Officers at the checkpoints charge 200-300 Syrian pounds ($1-$1.40) for each kilogram of goods that passes through.
Inab Baladi attempted to reach Manfoush, but he refused to communicate with the media. He avoids anything that might make it possible to prove what he does. According to some sources, he does not even sign his own name on the bills and receipts he gives to small business owners in Ghouta. Inab Baladi was not able to secure any document or bill that bears his name.
Manfoush is not the only businessman who brings goods into Ghouta. Well-connected businessmen, faction leaders and Assad's officers control the market and the movement of goods - and therefore people's lives. However, none of them is as as well known and influences the market as much as Manfoush, after whom the main checkpoint at the city of al-Tal in Rif Dimashq was named.
In addition to bringing in military supplies, the main purpose of the tunnels was to break Manfoush's and the regime officers' monopoly on the market. This was why independent businessmen were allowed to bring their goods through the tunnels. However, the prices did not really fall.
Inab Baladi met with one of the directors of Rahma (Mercy) Foundation, whose name, along with our other sources, has been withheld for their protection. The foundation is a front for Failaq al-Rahman and is in charge of Rahma tunnel. According to the manager, the tunnel, which was initially dug to break the monopoly on the market, did not help ease the suffering of the besieged people because it was turned into profitable venture for businessmen and faction leaders.
"Everyone finds in the tunnel the perfect opportunity to make money. Since the very first tunnel was completed, Fajr al-Umma, the faction that had dug the tunnel, took control of all incoming goods and sold them for extremely high prices. In 2014, for example, 1kg of sugar was sold for 60-70 Syrian pounds [around 30 cents] in Damascus, but Fajr al-Umma sold it for 3,500 Syrian pounds [more than $16] within Ghouta," says the manager.
The director also pointed out that every month Fajr al-Umma gave away free food and a tank of propane for people in Harasta in an attempt to strengthen its popularity in the area, while people in some areas in Ghouta were suffering from malnutrition.
At this point, Jaish al-Islam, Fatah al-Sham and Failaq al-Rahman interfered and put pressure on Fajr al-Umma to give them access to the tunnel. As a result, they -- together with local councils, civil organizations and relief offices -- gained access to the tunnel for 14 days every month, while Fajr al-Umma had access for the rest of the month.
The director explained that the faction charged 10 percent of anything that came into Ghouta through the tunnel, even when it was for medical or relief uses. If the medical office, for example, brought in 10 boxes, the faction would take one box, regardless of its content.
He also pointed out that the faction leaders were in full control of all movement through the tunnel, because, as they claimed, they had to protect their fighters. This was also revealed in a leaked video made public in May 2016, which documented a meeting between Zahran Alloush, the former commander of Jaish al-Islam; Abdul Nassir Shamir, the commander of Faylaq al-Islam; and Abu Khaled al-Zahta, the commander of Fajr al-Umma and the one in charge of the tunnel.
According to the director of the Rahma Foundation and a number of officials in local councils, Fajr al-Umma required civil institutions and local councils to sell food at a fixed price, determined by what the faction itself found suitable for the market. If their pricing scheme was not applied, the faction would refuse to let food through the tunnel.